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This paper presents a model of media competition with free entry when media operators are 
financed both from advertisers and customers. The relation between advertising receipts and 
sales receipts, which are both complementary and antagonist, is different if media operators 
impose a price or a quantity to advertisers. When consumers dislike advertising, media 
operators are better off setting an advertising price than an advertising quantity. We establish 
a relationship between the equilibrium levels (advertising and entry) and the advertising 
technology. In particular, media operators’ profit is not affected by the introduction of 
advertising when they impose advertising quantities and when advertising exhibits constant 
returns to scale in the audience size. Under constant or increasing returns to scale in the 
audience size, we find an excessive level of entry and an insufficient level of advertising.  
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manuscript. 1 Introduction
For any ￿rm that intends to market its product, buyers must be viewed as a
scarce resource. To transform potential buyers into active buyers, the min-
imum required is to inform the former about the existence of the product
and about its physical, spatial and economic characteristics. In some cir-
cumstances, this transmission of information can be performed with a high
degree of precision through personalized advertising, particularly for inter-
mediary products sold to ￿rms. But in most cases, the would-be seller only
has a fuzzy idea on who and where potential buyers are. Like a ￿sher in
cloudy water who uses large nets, the seller will have to use large scale media
to get some chances of catching buyers. This procedure has two drawbacks.
First it has low return since it is random both at the emission stage (the
advertiser does not know whether receivers are potential buyers) and at the
reception level (all the potential buyers will not receive the message). The
second drawback is that non potential buyers also receive the message and
this will probably disturb them if they have paid the media for its content:
the interruption of a movie by commercials is likely to divert couch potatoes
from channels that abuse of interruption.
On the media side, advertising can be the principal way to collect the
funds necessary to pay programming costs.1 For example, the technology
used by TV broadcasting does not allow to exclude viewers.2 Consequently,
the media operator cannot break even without the help of public ￿nancing
or advertising.3 For media operators, the dilemma is as follows: to devote
a large room for advertising increases revenues from manufacturers but de-
creases revenues from readers or watchers who are only ready to pay for the
entertainment or documentary content. Likewise, the manufacturers accept
to pay for advertising on condition that the media they invest in do have
enough buyers.
1In 2003, according to a study by the french Senat, advertising accounted for around
40 % of the revenues for TV and the press, 55 % for radio. Total media revenue in
France were 10.24 billion euros, with 4 b. for press and 3.75 b. for TV. Advertising on
Internet is also increasing very fast, it is evaluated at $9.6 billion for 2004 in the US (IAB,
PriceWaterhouseCooper).
2Thanks to decoders, some channels can exclude viewers who do not contribute to the
production budget. (See Canal+ in Europe). Note also that the digital terrestrial TV will
allow to control the access to selected broadcast channels.
3There exist some exceptions of media operators that balance their budget with volun-
tary contributions.
1We construct a free entry model to analyze the relation between adver-
tising receipts and sales receipts in the sectors of newspapers, magazines,
cable TV, coded broadcast TV, etc. where consumers have to pay to read
articles or to view programs. In these activities, services and ads are both
complementary (they increase the total revenue of the media owner) and
antagonist (they can be hardly increased simultaneously). We consider the
Salop￿ s model of horizontal di⁄erentiation. In a ￿rst stage, the media opera-
tors must decide whether to enter the market or not; if they enter, they incur
a ￿xed entry cost. In a second stage, media operators compete in subscription
prices to attract consumers, and decide how much to advertise. As regards
advertising, media operators can either impose an advertising level (quantity
game) or an advertising price (price game). This distinction is important
because the interaction between advertising revenues and sales revenues is
di⁄erent in the two cases. In the quantity game, media operators compete in
advertising volumes and the advertising price is ￿xed by the market at the
willingness to pay of the marginal advertiser. The demand for advertising
is thus independent of the demand for media services. In the price game,
the demand for advertising depends on both the advertising price and the
audience of the media. An increase in any price has thus a complex impact
due to the two-sided nature of the interaction between the customers and the
supply of ads.4 At equilibrium, the amount of advertising is the same in the
two games but the equilibrium subscription price is di⁄erent. In the price
game, the subscription price is lower when consumers value advertising and
higher when consumers dislike ads. In the latter case, the pro￿t of the media
operators is thus smaller when they use a pricing rule that ties the price of
an ad to its true value.
One important feature of the model is that we allow for di⁄erent advertis-
ing technologies in the sense that we de￿ne how an increase in the audience
modi￿es the unit value of an ad. We consider three cases. In the benchmark
case, advertising exhibits constant returns to scale in the audience size and
the unit value of an ad is just a ￿xed value per customer. In this case, we
show that, in the advertising quantity game, the entry is the same as without
advertising and consumers are better o⁄. The welfare analysis indicates that
entry is always excessive (and is more excessive when media operators set
an advertising price) and that the level of advertising is insu¢ cient. We also
4See Jullien (2005) for an introduction to two-sided markets. For more detailed analysis,
see Caillaud-Jullien (2001, 2003), Rochet-Tirole (2003), Armstrong (2004).
2consider increasing returns in the audience so that a larger audience implies
a larger unit value of an ad. We obtain the same welfare results : entry is
excessive and advertising is insu¢ cient, and the quantity game does better
than the price game. Third, we consider the opposite case where increasing
the audience decreases the unit value on an ad. The e⁄ect on ￿rms pro￿t
and consumer surplus is directly linked to this ad unit value. Compared to a
world without advertising, media operators always bene￿t from advertising
when there are decreasing returns in the audience. Welfare results are am-
biguous. We may obtain excessive entry with either excessive or insu¢ cient
advertising or insu¢ cient entry with insu¢ cient advertising.
The literature on this topic includes Anderson and Coate (2003), Gab-
szewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2001a,b), Armstrong (2004), Dukes and Gal-Or
(2003), Ferrando, Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2003), Peitz and Valletti
(2004) or Reisinger (2004) who develop spatial models of broadcasting com-
petition in which two media operators compete in both programming and
advertising levels. Papers by Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2001) and
Dukes and Gal-Or (2003) analyze the impact of advertising on the level of
di⁄erentiation. They ￿nd that advertising reduces di⁄erentiation between
media operators. More recently, Peitz and Valletti (2004) compare both the
advertising intensity and the level of di⁄erentiation when media operators
o⁄er free services and when the subscription price is positive. Our model
does not allow for endogenous di⁄erentiation apart from the impact of entry,
but we also conclude that free services are associated with larger advertising
levels when customers dislike advertising (the reverse holds if the consumers
like advertising). The analysis of Anderson and Coate (2003) focuses on wel-
fare issues. They show that equilibrium advertising levels can be above or
below socially optimal levels and that media operators can provide too many
or too few programs.
Our equilibrium analysis is close to Armstrong (2004) who presents the
comparison between an advertising quantity game and an advertising price
game in the Hotelling model. His results are akin to those presented in this
paper : setting an advertising price modi￿es the elasticity of the demand
function. The equilibrium subscription price is lower (resp. higher) when
media compete in advertising quantity rather than in advertising price when
consumers dislike (resp. like) advertising.
These models do not allow to endogenize the number of active media.
Choi (2003) uses the Salop￿ s model of horizontal di⁄erentiation to analyze
broadcast competition between media stations that are only ￿nanced through
3advertising. In his model, customers freely access to stations. His result is
similar to Anderson and Coate￿ s : there is no clear-cut answer to the e⁄ect of
entry and advertising. Our analysis extends Choi￿ s work by introducing price
competition to attract viewers/readers. The results obtained using a setting
similar to Choi￿ s (advertising quantity game and constant unit ad value) are
rather di⁄erent. In our model, and under the assumption of constant returns
to scale, advertising does not a⁄ect ￿rms￿pro￿t and the level of entry is thus
without ambiguity excessive. The bene￿t of imposing prices to consumers
depends on the returns to scale of advertising on the audience. When returns
to scale are constant or increasing and when consumers dislike advertising,
pay-media pro￿ts are higher than free-media pro￿ts when the subscription
price is positive.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we construct a simple
monopoly model in order to exhibit the main trade-o⁄s in the double ￿nanc-
ing of media and we extend it to the multistation case using the Salop￿ s model
of horizontal di⁄erentiation. In section 3, we analyze the long run equilib-
rium of an industry with advertising resources in the Salop￿ s framework. We
present the advertising quantity game and the advertising price game and
provide a comparison of the advertising and quantity models with a free
media model. Section 4 presents the welfare analysis. Section 5 concludes.
2 A simple monopoly model
To get a ￿rst insight in the problem of balancing sale revenues and advertising
revenues in the media industry, consider the simple case of a media operator
that is a monopolist for its services.
2.1 Model setting
There is an entry cost k; and with q media "customers" paying for the service,
the operating cost is cq. Advertisers are producers of goods and services who
are interested in selling their products to customers and post ads on the
media support. We do not provide a detailed analysis of how the producers
decide to advertise in order to inform/persuade the customers to buy their
goods and services. We just assume that the relationship between customers
and advertisers is synthesized by a demand a for advertising spots. This
advertising demand is a function a = A(s;q) increasing with the audience
4q and decreasing with the advertising price s, leading to an inverse demand
s(q;a) that represents the willingness to pay for one advertising message





the willingness to pay for an ad per customer. De￿ne also
’(q;a) ￿ v(q;a)a;
the advertising revenue of the media operator per customer. The total revenue
from advertising is then
r(q;a) = q’(q;a) = s(q;a)a;
that is assumed to be concave in a: We also assume that for q ￿ 1, vq has
a constant sign and jvqj and jvqqj are uniformly bounded and small enough
(see section 3.2). In particular r is increasing with q:
This advertising demand function can be generated as follows. There is a
continuum of advertisers indexed by ￿ who want to advertise their products,
where ￿ is uniformly distributed on [0;1]: Each of them may post one ad.
The ad of advertiser ￿ reaches the q customers of the media, which generates
a net cash-￿ ow qv(q;￿) to advertiser ￿. The function v(q;￿) is an index
of the average e¢ ciency of advertising, decreasing with ￿. It depends on
the characteristics of the media and on the geographical and sociological
dispersion of the households. At unit price s; advertiser ￿ will post an ad i⁄
qv(q;￿) ￿ s. Therefore the marginal advertiser is ^ ￿ such that qv(q; ^ ￿) = s,
and the total demand for ads is de￿ned as a =
R ^ ￿
0 d￿ since density is equal
to 1. We deduce that qv(q;a) = s so that the indirect demand function for
advertising is de￿ned by s(q;a) = qv(q;a):
Depending on the nature of the media, v(q;a) can have di⁄erent forms.
In the benchmark case, v(q;a) is a constant in q. Since the willingness to
pay for the product is the same over consumers, manufacturer ￿ is willing to
pay up to qv(q;a) = qv(0;a) to post an ad.
If there are some increasing returns from the audience size, we have
vq(q;a) > 0: This is the case when potential buyers are scattered among
the audience of the media and some network e⁄ects allow to transmit infor-
mation by word of mouth.
5By contrast, when vq(q;a) < 0, there are decreasing returns in advertising
because potential buyers are concentrated and well identi￿ed in the set of
households. An increase in the size of the audience of the media will bring a
lower average revenue to announcers.
Assuming that the demand for subscription by readers/viewers depends
on the subscription price p and on the level of advertising a, denote by Q(p;a)
this demand. The drawback of advertising is that the willingness to pay for
the services supplied by the media operator may be decreasing with a, be-
cause most users are interested in the content of articles or programs, not in
the incentives to buy other products. These people use pop-up blockers on
web browsers and digital video recorders to skip the ads when watch recorded
programs. In some speci￿c cases however, it can be true that customers en-
joy ads.5 Here, we don￿ t impose that the demand is decreasing and assume
instead that the demand function for the media Q(p;a) is continuously dif-
ferentiable, decreasing with the subscription price p and has an inverted U
shape with respect to the number of ads a. A small amount of ads may thus
raise demand but beyond some point the impact becomes negative.
2.2 Balancing the two sources of revenues
The media monopolist￿ s problem is
max
p;s;a;q pq + sa ￿ cq (1)
s.t. q = Q(p;a) (2)
a = A(s;q) (3)
The cost of maintaining the media is supposed to be ￿xed, whatever its
content. Plugging (3) into (2), for given prices p and s, the demand and the
supply of content services is de￿ned by q = Q(p;A(s;q)), that we assume to
have a unique solution for simplicity.
5It is the case for magazines specialized in fashion or cars. It can also be true for some
speci￿c events: ￿ the Super Bowl is a showcase for television commercials, and more than
a quarter of viewers tune in just to watch the ads￿(The Economist, April 2nd 2005, ￿ A
survey of consumer power￿ , p.3).
6We solve the maximization problem by inverting relations (2) and (3),
and expressing the prices as functions of q and a : we obtain p = p(q;a); and
s = s(q;a): The pro￿t is then
p(q;a)q + r(q;a) ￿ cq = (p(q;a) + ’(q;a) ￿ c)q
that must be maximized with respect to q and a. Assuming an interior
solution, the ￿rst order conditions are6
p(q;a) + qpq(q;a) = c ￿ rq(q;a) (4)
’a(q;a) = ￿pa(q;a) (5)
Both equations depict the usual equality between marginal revenue and
marginal cost. In equation (5), the cost of advertising is represented by the
decrease in sales revenue per customer pa due to a lower willingness to pay for
content. In condition (4), the marginal revenue is equated to the opportunity
cost of a customer: the unit cost per customer is decreased by the marginal
revenue from advertising, re￿ ecting the fact that each new customer of the
media operator is a potential buyer for the producers that advertise, which
allows to increase advertising revenue. Note that, as c is very low in some
media markets (the Internet for instance), it can result from (4) that the
media operator ￿xes a price p such that marginal revenue is negative. And
if the media operator has a weak market power (as measured by qpq(q;a) in
(4)), it is even possible for the price to be negative, for example because the
media operator attracts subscribers by means of gifts, and uses its subscribers
list to increase the tari⁄ of ads. If negative prices are not feasible, then the
media will be distributed for free to the customers (see below).
In terms of prices we obtain
















where ￿A=s ￿ ￿sAs
a > 0 and ￿Q=p ￿ ￿p
Qp
q > 0.
6The pro￿t function is supposed to be strictly concave so that the ￿rst order conditions
are su¢ cient to determine the global maximum. Moreover, we assume that ’a(q;0) +
pa(q;0) > 0 so that the optimal advertising expenditure is strictly positive.
7These are standard formulas for multi-product pricing by a monopolist.
One can see q
Qa
Qp as the opportunity cost of ads, that is equal to the reduction
in the media operator￿ s revenues from sales when a increases and p is adjusted
so as to maintain q: The interpretation is symmetric for ads: the term ￿a
Aq
As >
0 is the opportunity revenue form keeping a ￿xed by balancing changes in q
and s. Note that by (6), at the equilibrium point the elasticity of the demand
for the service is smaller than in the case where there is no advertising.
Moreover, if c is small, it is possible that ￿Q=p < 1 at the equilibrium point,
which never occurs in models without advertising resources.
2.3 The multistation monopoly
To prepare the analysis of competition in the next section, we now adopt
the Salop￿ s model of horizontal di⁄erentiation where the monopoly operates
n websites, newspapers or TV stations. Media customers are uniformly dis-
tributed along a circle of length equal to 1. When the consumer located at
point x subscribes to station i located at point xi, his net utility is
u(x;xi;ai) ￿ pi = ￿ u ￿ tjx ￿ xij ￿ ￿(ai) ￿ pi (8)
where ￿(:) is the disutility from ads (the "nuisance e⁄ect" as Anderson and
Coate (2003) call it), t is the unit cost of transport, ￿ u is the reservation
utility, ai is the level of advertising programmed by i and pi the subscription
rate to the service provided by site i. The function ￿(:) is assumed to be
convex and ￿
0(a) tends to +1 when a goes to in￿nity, moreover ￿(0) = 0:7
A site is created at costs k; and it is operated at a constant marginal cost
c: When a new site is created, the monopoly relocates the other sites evenly
on the circle. For the moment we take the number of sites n as given.
Concerning advertising we assume that advertisers can post one ad per
site. In this context the demand for advertising space at a given media site
depends only on its price si and its mass of customers qi.8 Thus we focus
on the impact of advertising on the allocation of customers, and ignore the
issue of the allocation of advertisers. The demand of ads to station i is
7The disutility ￿(a) may however be negative for small values of a or for some group
of media clients.
8Schmidtke (2005) considers a more complex relation between advertisers and medias.
The demand of advertising space for a given media operator depends on its price and its
mass of clients as well as on the price and the audience of the other medias.
8then ai = A(si;qi); leading to a revenue r(qi;ai) = qi’(qi;ai): We assume
throughout that ’a(q;0) > ￿
0(0) and ’aa < 0; which ensures that there will
be a positive ￿nite level of advertising, uniquely de￿ned.
We ￿rst assume that all customers subscribe to one media service and we
determine how customers chose between station i and station i+1 located at
xi+1 > xi. Assuming that both sites have a positive demand, the consumer
indi⁄erent between subscribing at i or at i + 1 is located at ~ xi+1 de￿ned by
￿ u ￿ ￿(ai) ￿ t(~ xi+1 ￿ xi) ￿ pi = ￿ u ￿ ￿(ai+1) ￿ t(xi+1 ￿ ~ xi+1) ￿ pi+1
From this condition we obtain
~ xi+1 =






In the interval [xi;xi+1], all the consumers with an address x ￿ ~ xi+1
are customers of site i. Their number is ~ xi+1 ￿ xi. But station i also has a
boundary with station i￿1. From this side of the market, it attracts xi￿~ xi￿1
consumers, where
~ xi￿1 =






Consequently, the number of consumers of media site i is qi = ~ xi+1 ￿ ~ xi￿1.
We deduce that the demand to station i is given by
qi =






As we will consider only symmetric equilibria with n active media sta-
tions, let pi+1 = pi￿1 = pn denote the price ￿xed by the closest sites for the
service they sell and let ai+1 = ai￿1 = an their advertising quantity. The
distance between the two closest sites of i is 2





￿(an) ￿ ￿(ai) + pn ￿ pi
t
:
which obviously reduces to qi = 1
n when the monopoly implements a uniform
pricing and advertising policy through all its stations.
Consider now optimal prices pn and advertising levels an: When the mar-
ket is covered, the saturation of the participation constraint (8) of the most
9remote customer (the one at distance 1
2n from any station) gives the sub-
scription price




By contrast, when the monopoly does not serve all the would-be cus-
tomers, from (8) the marginal customer is the one at distance
￿ u￿p￿￿(a)
t from
any site. Therefore, the demand of service to a site is
qn = 2:









We must determine the advertising price, the audience and the number
of stations. Using (10) and (11), this reduces to
max
a;q;n n(￿ u ￿
tq
2






Clearly the optimal level of advertising is
a
￿(q) = argmaxa (’(q;a) ￿ ￿(a)):





Equation (12) states that the marginal advertising revenue per consumer
must be equal to the marginal disutility of advertising. Increasing the amount
of advertising a for a given clientele q generates a marginal revenue per
customers ra
q = ’a and requires to reduce the subscription price by ￿
0 so as
to maintain the clientele. Notice that the level of advertising is independent of
the transport cost. Notice also that it is not always the case that ￿
0 (a) > 0 at
the optimal level of advertising: whenever the revenue per customer decreases
with total advertising at the level that maximizes the utility of customers,
the media chooses to restrict advertising beyond this level.
10It is immediate that the market is covered (qn = 1
n) if and only if n ￿ ￿ n




q (￿ u ￿
tq
2
￿ c + max
a (’(q;a) ￿ ￿(a)))q:
Under our assumptions, it is always the case that maxa (’(q;a) ￿ ￿(a)) >
0; which implies that the pro￿t per station is always strictly larger when
advertising is used. Moreover the market is covered with advertising when it
is covered without.
When the monopolist maximizes its pro￿t by a full coverage of the market,











￿ k = 0 (13)
Clearly, the e⁄ect of advertising on the multistation monopoly￿ s choice
of diversity depends on the sign of ’q: With constant returns, n is the same
with and without advertising. When there are decreasing returns to ads, ’q is
negative and the monopolist will choose a greater diversity with advertising
than without. This is because reducing the size of the population of cus-
tomers targeted by one ad (by raising the number of sites) raises the return
from advertising and thus the advertising revenue. The reverse is true in the
case where ’ increases with the audience.
3 Oligopolistic competition
We now consider that there is competition in the media industry where cus-
tomers are depicted by the Salop￿ s model. From now on, the index i identi￿es
an independent media operator (a media). Medias set prices pi for the ser-
vice they propose to customers, but we contrast two cases for the advertising
market. In the ￿rst case, media ￿x the level ai of advertising and let the
price si adjust to maintain the quantity.9 In the other case media set the
price si for ads and let the quantity ai adjust. The next two sections analyze
these two possibilities.
9In the case of constant returns (’(q;a) = ’(a)), setting the quantity a is equivalent
to setting a price
’(a)
a per client so that r = q’(a): In the general case, a ￿xed quantity




We ￿rst consider the case where media set the level of advertising. So we
assume that they simultaneously set (pi;ai); then the demand qi is realized
as described in section 2.3 and the price si adjusts to s(ai;qi); leading to a
revenue r(ai;qi): A symmetric equilibrium obtains when the mass of customer
is q = 1
n; while the equilibrium price is pn and the level of advertising is an:To
derive the equilibrium conditions we focus on the ￿rst order conditions of the
media operators￿optimal strategies. We will derive second order and global
existence conditions at the end of the section.
Consider ￿rst the optimal strategy of media i when there are n media








￿(an) ￿ ￿(a) + pn ￿ p
t
)(p ￿ c) + r(q;a) (14)
where r(q;a) = q’(q;a):
The ￿rst order conditions are evaluated at pn = p and an = a to de￿ne

























We postpone the discussion of existence of a pure strategy equilibrium to
the end of the section, where it is shown that the ￿rst order conditions are
su¢ cient if ’q ￿ 0 or ’q not too large.
Before looking at the general case, consider the case where there are
constant returns, ’(q;a) = ’(a) so that ’q ￿ 0 and the advertising revenue





￿(an) ￿ ￿(a) + pn ￿ p
t
)(p ￿ c + ’(a)):







)(h ￿ c + ’(a) ￿ ￿(a)):
12It is then clear that the media will choose the advertising level:
a
￿ = argmax
a (’(a) ￿ ￿(a)):
Concerning the subscription price, we can observe that the equilibrium he-
donic price pn+￿(a￿) is the same as in a Salop model with a cost c￿’(a￿)+
￿(a￿); leading to pn = c + t
n ￿ ’(a￿):
In the general case where ’q 6= 0 we obtain the following equilibrium
levels













In the general case, we have rq > 0 so the equilibrium price is below
c + t
n: The subscription equilibrium price is lowered by an audience e⁄ect
of advertising. Like in the multistation monopoly case, equation (16) states
that the marginal advertising revenue per consumer must be equal to the
marginal disutility of advertising. For a ￿xed number of ￿rms, the level of
advertising is thus the same in the quantity model and in the multistation
monopoly : each media acts has a local monopoly in the advertising market.
When the number of media operators n becomes large, an = a￿( 1
n) con-
verges to a￿(0) > 0; and rq(an; 1
n) converges to ’(0;a￿(0)) > 0, so that the
subscription price is below the marginal production cost c.
Proposition 1 Assume that media set the advertising quantity. For n large
enough, the price is below marginal cost.
A standard comparative static analysis adds the following result.
Lemma 2 ￿
an > a￿(0) and dan
dn < 0 if ’aq > 0
an < a￿(0) and dan
dn > 0 if ’aq < 0
The proof is straightforward by totally di⁄erentiating the ￿rst order con-
dition 16.
13If we insert the ￿rst order conditions into (8), the equilibrium level of
individual utility for the consumer located at x when there are n active
media is then given by







where jx ￿ xij ￿ 1=2n.
Similarly, the equilibrium level of (variable) pro￿t of the individual media













As compared with a world without advertising, we see that the e⁄ect of

















The e⁄ect of advertising on the media operator pro￿t crucially depends
on the advertising technology. Advertising increases the revenue of the media
operator but it also has a negative impact on the subscription price to the
media. The total e⁄ect is given by the sign of ’q. When advertising exhibits
constant return to scale in the audience, the total e⁄ect is null. Advertising
has no impact on media operators￿pro￿ts. If returns to scale are decreasing,
’q < 0, each media operator earns more money than in the no advertising
case.
For customers, the e⁄ect of advertising depends on the sign of (rq ￿ ￿).
If the "price decrease e⁄ect" rq is higher than the "nuisance e⁄ect" ￿; the
customers are better o⁄ when media can provide advertising. Notice that
rq ￿ ￿ is the derivative with respect to q of maxa (r(q;a) ￿ ￿(a)q); which
is the revenue net of the nuisance and thus the total surplus generated by
advertising for the media and its customers. Thus the customers bene￿t from
advertising whenever maxa (r(q;a) ￿ ￿(a)q) is increasing with q.
The term rq ￿ ￿ is clearly positive if ￿ < 0: Now suppose that ￿ > 0:
Then, using r = q’; and ’ = av(q;a) and since ￿0


















14Given that ￿(an) is positive and ￿(:) is convex, 1 > ￿
a￿0 > 0; and va < 0:
Therefore the e⁄ect of advertising is positive when returns to scale in the
audience are constant or increasing (’q ￿ 0). When returns to scale are
decreasing, each oligopolist bene￿ts from advertising only when ’q is close
to 0. When n is large, note that q’q converges to zero so that the e⁄ect is
positive.
These results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The advertising technology determines the impact of adver-
tising on media pro￿ts and consumers￿surplus. As compared with the no-
advertising case, for a ￿xed number of media operators:
i) under constant returns to scale in the audience (’q = 0), media pro￿ts
are not a⁄ected by advertising and the consumers￿surplus is higher;
ii) under increasing returns to scale (’q > 0); media pro￿ts are lower and
the consumers￿surplus is higher than without advertising;
iii) under decreasing returns to scale (’q < 0); media pro￿ts are higher;
moreover the consumers￿surplus is higher when n is large enough, or when ￿ ￿’q
￿ ￿ is small enough, or when ￿(an) < 0:
In the long run, the equilibrium number of media operators is given ap-
proximately by ￿(n) = k.
We assume that for all q and a￿(q) = argmaxa(’(q;a) ￿ ￿(a)); the fol-
lowing condition holds:




Condition (17), which guarantees the existence of the equilibrium, implies
also that the pro￿t is decreasing with respect to n: Thus there exists a unique
equilibrium number of entrants.10 De￿ne n￿
C the level of entry in the quantity













10Monotonicity of the equilibrium pro￿t with respect to n is given by
@￿(n)
@n < 0, which














that entry is thus similar to the entry in a world without advertising when
there are constant return to scale in the audience. Moreover:
Corollary 4 The level of entry is higher with advertising than without if
the price of advertising per customer decreases with the audience (decreasing
returns to scale). It is lower under increasing returns to scale.
Global existence conditions
In the Salop model (a ￿ 0); the pro￿t function is concave and ￿rst-order
conditions are su¢ cient for equilibrium. Notice that in the case ’q ￿ 0; the
level of advertising is a￿(0) for any price p set by the media, so that the
model is equivalent to a Salop model with a marginal cost c￿’(a￿(0)): Thus
￿rst-order conditions are su¢ cient to prove existence.
This may not be the case in our general model due to nonlinearity in
advertising resources which changes the gains from increasing the size of the
clientele. The su¢ cient conditions for the existence of the equilibrium are
given in the following lemma.
Lemma 5 Under condition 17, (pn;an) is an equilibrium if and only if a













Observe that condition 17 is veri￿ed under constant return to scale in
the audience. Else, it requires that the ￿rst and second derivatives of ’ with





We now suppose that the decision variable of the media is the price of adver-
tising. Thus media i chooses a subscription price pi and an advertising price
si:
The new feature is that unlike the previous case, the demand to media
i does not depend only on the strategies of its two adjacent competitors,
16but on all the prices of all the media operators. Starting from a symmetric
equilibrium, suppose that media i changes its pricing strategy. From (9), we
see that it modi￿es the demand for its service as well as the demand addressed
to the adjacent media. Additionally, since the demand for advertising at
media i is
ai = A(si;qi); (19)
a change in si will change the demand for advertising to media i as well as
to the adjacent media operators. As a consequence, the demand of service to
the next media operators i+2 and i￿2 will incur an additional change, and
it will be the same for the demand for advertising they face. Following this
reasoning we see that the demands for both services and advertising to all
media are a⁄ected. We refer to this as a propagation e⁄ect, along the circle.
Therefore, when one price changes, in order to determine the ￿nal e⁄ect
on sales and advertising we have to solve for the complete allocation. The
following lemma establishes the relations between all these variations, in the
case of a marginal change in prices.
Lemma 6 Starting from a symmetric situation where all prices are p for
services and s for ads, and quantities are q = 1
n and a; suppose that media i
changes its prices by dpi and dsi: Then the changes in demands for service






dai = Aqdqi + Asdsi (21)
where ￿(n;a) is given by
￿(n;a) =
1 + ￿(n;a)n
(1 ￿ ￿(n;a))(1 ￿ ￿(n;a)n￿1)
and ￿(n;a) is a root of















￿ > 1 when ￿
0(a) > 0







17The di⁄erence with the case where media set advertising quantities is the
term ￿ in (20). When consumers dislike advertising (￿
0(a) > 0), the subscrip-
tion demand is less sensitive to the subscription price (for a given level of
ai). To understand this e⁄ect, suppose that media i increases its subscription
price by 1 unit. Absent advertising, this would reduce the demand for its
service by 1
t: The immediate e⁄ect is to raise the demand of customers to
adjacent operators. As a consequence the levels of advertising at adjacent
operators also increase. But this reduces the attractiveness of adjacent oper-
ators so that the ￿nal reduction is smaller than 1
t: There is a feedback e⁄ect






0(a) < 0), the feedback e⁄ect reinforces the de-
mand e⁄ect so that the ￿nal reduction in the demand is larger than 1
t. If
the value of ￿
0(a) is too small so that consumers hugely value advertising,
the feedback e⁄ect becomes too important to guarantee the existence of the
equilibrium.
The marginal e⁄ects of prices are obtained by combining the feedback
e⁄ect with the propagation e⁄ect discussed above.
Now consider the optimal pricing strategy of media i when there are n
media operators and the (n ￿ 1) competitors charge prices sn and pn. We
di⁄erentiate the pro￿t function with respect to q and a, rather than to p and
s. The ￿rst order condition with respect to q is p+q
@p
@q +rq ￿c = 0 and the
￿rst order condition with respect to a is q
@p
@a +ra = 0: But, since from 20 the









Now, evaluate the solution at a = an and q = 1
n to obtain the symmetric
equilibrium. It results that the subscription price pn and the individual
advertising volume an are given by












where the term ￿(n;an) captures the fact that the price charged by competi-
tors for advertising is ￿xed.
18There are now two e⁄ects on the subscription price. First rq > 0; and,
like in the quantity game, the subscription equilibrium price is lowered by the
audience e⁄ect of advertising. But a second indirect e⁄ect depending on the
value of the disutility from ads arises. When consumers dislike ads, because
the volume of advertising in media competitors is endogenous, it is harder to
capture market shares. The changes in volumes of advertising mitigate the
price e⁄ects. As discussed above, the elasticity of the ￿nal residual demand
is lower with advertising than without. This e⁄ect, that appears through
￿ > 1 in (22) tends to raise the equilibrium price and media are better o⁄ in
the "price game" as compared with the "quantity game". When consumers
slightly like advertising, we obtain a di⁄erent result because the indirect
e⁄ect reinforces the price e⁄ect (￿ < 1 in (22)). In this case, the elasticity
of the ￿nal residual demand is higher with advertising than without. As a
consequence, media are worse o⁄ in the "price game" as compared with the
"quantity game". Note also that in the particular case where consumers are
indi⁄erent about advertising, the quantity and the price model do not di⁄er.
These results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 7 When media set the price of advertising, the equilibrium level
of advertising is the same as when they set the volume of advertising, but
the subscription price is larger when consumers dislike advertising and lower
when they slightly like advertising.
For n large enough the subscription price is below the marginal cost:
pn < c:
This di⁄erence between a price model and a quantity model is also em-
phasized in Armstrong (2004). With a two ￿rm model, he obtains a similar
relation between pro￿ts and consumers￿taste for advertising : media pro￿ts
increase (resp. decrease) when setting an advertising price compared to set-
ting an advertising quantity when consumers dislike (resp. like) advertising.
As before, when compared with a world without advertising, we see that






n2(￿ ￿ 1) + r ￿ qrq
=
t




19Consider ￿rst that consumers dislike advertising. With constant or de-
creasing returns in the audience size (’q ￿ 0), the price game gives the same
result than the quantity game : each media operator earns more money than
in the no advertising case. When ’q > 0, the negative e⁄ect on pro￿ts is
alleviated by an increase in the subscription price. We show in the appendix
that when n increases, ￿ evolves as
p
n: This implies that when the number
of media operators is large, media operators make more pro￿ts than in the
no-advertising case, which was not the case in the quantity game.
For the consumer, the e⁄ect of advertising depends on the sign of (rq ￿
￿)￿ t
n2(￿￿1). When n is large, rq ￿￿ is strictly positive, while we have seen
that ￿￿1
n goes to zero. The following proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 8 Assume that consumers dislike advertising and that the me-
dia set the price of advertising. For n large enough, the media operators￿
pro￿ts and consumers￿surplus are higher than without advertising.
Consider now the case where consumers like advertising. In this case, the
feedback e⁄ect reinforces competition between media so that the pro￿t can
decrease compared with the no advertising game. Medias lose pro￿ts when
there are constant or increasing returns to scale in the audience. Under
decreasing returns, media operators can earn more money than in the no
advertising case if the transportation cost is small enough.
Let us now evaluate the level of entry in the price game and compare it
to the level of entry in the quantity game. De￿ne n￿
B the level of entry in the














Like in the quantity model, there exists a unique equilibrium number of
entrants. When consumers dislike advertising, since pro￿ts are higher when
media impose an advertising price, we obtain a larger number of entrants in
the price model than in the quantity model.
3.3 Free versus pay media
In the above analysis, we have concluded that the subscription price can be
negative. A negative price can correspond to gifts or can result from bundling
20some other good with the media. For example, publishers can bundle CDs
or DVDs with magazines. In other cases it is di¢ cult to support negative
prices, for instance when the concerned population is small and the rest of
the population can acquire the good at no cost and decide not to consume it
(with thus no bene￿t to advertisers). In this case the equilibrium subscription
price will be zero.
In this part we allow consumers to have free access to media services so
that media are only ￿nanced through advertising, and we study how the pric-
ing of media services impacts market performance. In particular we compare
the level of advertising and the level of media pro￿ts under pay and free
media services. For this part we ￿x the number of media operators.
When consumers can freely access to media services, results can be de-
rived by adjusting our ￿rst order condition to the constraint pn = 0: The





















media set an advertising price.
The comparison between aF and an is immediate when we observe that














Given that the sign of ￿
dq
da is the sign of ￿
0; we have the following imme-
diate result.
Proposition 9 Assume that aF is uniquely de￿ned. The advertising level
under free media (aF) is larger (resp. lower) than the advertising level under
pay media (an) when ￿
0(an)pn > 0 (resp. < 0):
Thus, when customers dislike advertising, pay-media will lead to less
advertising when equilibrium prices are positive.
The next question is whether media operators bene￿t from imposing pos-
itive subscription prices to consumers. We show that the bene￿t of imposing
prices to consumers depends on the advertising returns to scale in the audi-
ence.
11A detailed analysis for the case of quantity setting and constant returns to scale in
the audience can be found in Choi (2003).
21Proposition 10 Assume that media set the volume of advertising, and that
￿
0(:) > 0 and a￿(q) is non-decreasing (’aq ￿ 0). Free-media pro￿ts are
smaller than pay-media pro￿ts if and only if pn > 0:
The case where the equilibrium subscription cannot be negative raises
interesting issues. Suppose ￿rst that prices cannot fall below zero. Then ei-
ther the equilibrium subscription price is positive or the service is free. In
this circumstances, media can only be hurt by a collective move toward free
services.
4 Welfare analysis
We now establish the optimal number of media operators no and the optimal
advertising quantity ao.
To derive the welfare, we assume that there is no informational externality
between consumers related to advertising such as words of mouth. We also
assume that the goods o⁄ered by the producers are not competing. Welfare
can be computed as the sum of the consumers surplus, the advertisers￿surplus
and the media pro￿t. Social welfare can then be written as follows:










;￿)d￿ ￿ nk ￿ c: (27)
The expression in the square bracket represents consumers￿bene￿ts from
consuming the media services given a number n of media operators and a




turers￿bene￿ts (the bene￿t from advertising).




















The optimal level of advertising is such that the willingness to pay for
the marginal advertiser (the marginal social bene￿t of advertising) equals the
marginal disutility of advertising (the marginal social cost).
22A ￿rst relation between the socially optimal levels and the equilibrium
levels is stated in the following lemma. Denote n￿
C(a); n￿
B(a) and no(a)
the respective solutions of equations (18), (24) and (28) for a given value of
a: Denote ao(n) the welfare maximizing level of advertising for a given n;
solution of equation (29).
Lemma 11 We have that
i) ao(n) > an for all n.
ii) no(a) < n￿
C(a) for all a when vqa ￿ 0.
iii) no(a) < n￿
C(a) < n￿
B(a) for all a when ￿
0(a) > 0 and vqa ￿ 0.
The ￿rst part results from the exercise of market power by media on
the market for advertising. The second part is standard with the Salop
model. Because of a business stealing e⁄ect, for a given level of advertising,
there would be too many entrants. The third part comes from the analysis
conducted in section 3 : there is more entry in the price game than in the
quantity game only when consumers dislike advertising.
The next proposition characterizes the welfare analysis for the case of
constant and increasing returns to scale in the audience.
Proposition 12 Assume that consumers dislike advertising. When a￿(q) is
non-decreasing (’qa ￿ 0) and vqa ￿ 0; entry is excessive and advertising is
insu¢ cient. We have n￿
B > n￿
C > no and a￿
B ￿ a￿
C < ao.
This result of underprovision of advertising, as pointed out by Armstrong
(2004), comes from the fact that each media acts has a local monopoly in
the advertising market. When consumers are not charged for services, this
result of excessive entry and insu¢ cient advertising is not evident. Choi
(2003) shows in a Salop model of spatial competition where ￿rms are only
￿nanced by advertising revenues (with constant unit ad values) that entry
and advertising can be either excessive or insu¢ cient. This result of excessive
entry and insu¢ cient advertising is important when comparing the quantity
and the price model.
Corollary 13 Assume that consumers dislike advertising. When ’qa ￿ 0
and vqa ￿ 0, the quantity model is socially preferable to the price model.
23A simple case is when the average e¢ ciency of advertising v is separable
v(q;a) = g(q)G(a) with G(a) decreasing. If ￿(a) is increasing, we can restrict
the analysis to levels of advertising such that ’a ￿ 0: Then ’qa =
g0
g ’a and
vqa = g0G0: This means that the conditions are veri￿ed when there a con-
stant or increasing return. More generally, given that ’qa = vq + avqa; the
conditions require that vq ￿ 0:
This non-ambiguous result of excessive entry and insu¢ cient advertising
is more di¢ cult to obtain when there are decreasing returns to scale in the
audience. We may obtain excessive entry, which results in either excessive
or insu¢ cient advertising. If we have an insu¢ cient entry, then advertising
is without ambiguity insu¢ cient. Under decreasing returns to scale, the
choice between the two models is more di¢ cult. In particular, if entry is
excessive, we may obtain too much entry in the price game in comparison
of the advertising game but we may obtain an advertising level closer to the
socially optimal one in the advertising price game.
5 Conclusion
We have presented a model of media competition with free entry where media
are ￿nanced both from advertisers and viewers. The relation between adver-
tising receipts and sales receipts is analyzed trough two particular features :
on one hand the choice of the advertising price versus the advertising space
by the media operator, and on the other hand non linearity in the advertising
technology
Medias￿pro￿ts are higher when media operators set the advertising price
rather than the advertising quantity. As compared with a no-advertising
benchmark, when consumers dislike advertising and media set the advertising
space, media pro￿ts are higher under decreasing returns to scale, and they
are lower under increasing returns to scale. When they ￿x the advertising
price, their pro￿ts can be higher than without advertising if returns to scale
are increasing.
Is it socially better to let media to set the advertising space or the ad-
vertising price? When consumers dislike advertising, pro￿ts and prices are
higher when media choose the advertising price and, with a ￿xed market
structure, the level of advertising is the same in the two models. This results
in more entry in the advertising price game as compared with the advertis-
24ing quantity game. Entry is excessive under constant or increasing returns
to scale. We also have found an insu¢ cient amount of advertising larger in
the price model than in the quantity model. We thus obtain that, under
constant or increasing returns to scale in the audience, the quantity model is
socially superior to the price model. Under decreasing returns to scale, the
social advantage of one model over the other is more di¢ cult to assess. In
particular, we may obtain that the equilibrium level of entry is closer to the
socially optimal one in the quantity game but that the equilibrium level of
advertising is closer to the social optimum in the advertising price game.
25Global existence condition
Proof of lemma 5
Consider the symmetrical equilibrium with n active media operators. De-
note pn and an the equilibrium price and advertising levels.
De￿ne
^ ￿1(q;t) = (t(
1
n
￿ q) ￿ c + pn + ￿(an))q + max
a
(r(q;a) ￿ ￿(a)q):
Let us now consider the deviation of ￿rm i. Consider ￿rst a deviation
leading to q < 2
n: Then ￿rm i faces a demand
q =






The maximal pro￿t it can obtain while selling q < 2
n is then given by
^ ￿1(q;t): If the function ^ ￿1(q;t) is concave, deviations with q < 2
n are not
pro￿table. Notice that












is concave if ^ ￿1(q; t
2) is concave.
At q = 2
n; there is a discontinuity as if a customer at the distance 1
n buys
from the media, so do all customers at a distance below 3
2n. Therefore q jumps
at 3





￿rm i is indi⁄erent between purchasing from ￿rm i and purchasing from the
￿rm located at the distance
j
n from ￿rm i. We have that
￿(an) + pn + t(
j
n
￿ x) = ￿(a) + p + tx:
Then ￿rm i faces a demand
q =










n ] when announcing a price p = t(
j
n ￿
q) + ￿(an) ￿ ￿(a) + pn. The pro￿t of the deviating ￿rm is thus given by
^ ￿j(q) = (t(
j
n
￿ q) ￿ c + pn + ￿(an))q + max
a (r(q;a) ￿ ￿(a)q):
26This can be rewritten as














with equality if q =
2j￿1
n :
Observe next that ^ ￿1( 1
n;t) = ^ ￿1( 1
n; t
2), so that comparing the equilibrium
pro￿t with the deviation pro￿t when q > 3





Notice that ^ ￿1(q; t
2) is increasing with q at q = 1
n: When ^ ￿1(q; t
2) is concave
^ ￿1(q; t
2) ￿ ^ ￿1( 1
n; t
2) for all q ￿ 3
n if this is true for 3
n:
The su¢ cient conditions to guarantee that ￿rm i prefers not to deviate
are thus
i) The function ^ ￿1(q; t
2) is concave.
ii) ^ ￿1( 1
n; t
2) ￿ ^ ￿1( 3
n; t
2):








































which give the condition in the proposition.
Proof of lemma 6
Suppose that media 1 changes its prices p1 and s1. By symmetry, the
consequences of these changes will be the same for media i and n + 2 ￿ i:
27Using the demand functions for services (9) and the demand function for
advertising (19) we obtain
dq1 =
￿




















daj = Aqdqj for j ￿ 3:
Assume ￿rst that there are n = 2m media, then media m+1 is facing m and








Assume now that there are n = 2m+1 media, then media m+1 is facing
m and m+2 = n+2￿(m+1). In that case, we have dam+2 = dan￿m = dam+1



















da2 + da3 (33)
and condition (32) as







dai + dai+1; i = 3;::;m: (34)
Consider media m + 1:







dam+1 = dam (35)








dam+1 = dam + dam+1 (36)






x+x2: Observe that when ￿
0(a) > 0, the equation admits two
(positive) roots, and when ￿
0(a) < 0, the equation admits two (negative)




































































































m￿1 if n = 2m + 1

















































































m￿1 if n = 2m + 1 (40)
From (38) and (39) we can compute x and y corresponding to the case













￿ ￿ (￿m￿1 ￿ ￿m+1)




















￿ ￿ (￿m ￿ ￿m+1)







if n = 2m + 1


















for any n; even or odd.
30Using (30), we write the variation of quantity as
tdq1 = ￿

















The result can be extended to i 6= 1.
Proof of proposition 7
Assume ￿
0(a) > 0. Consider what happens when n is large. Recall that

























Using (44), when n increases, ￿




and thus tends to in￿nity. This implies that ￿(n;an) converges to 1 with

































n thus converges to zero, but at a the same rate as 1 p
n instead of 1
n.
The term rq converges to ’(0;a￿(0)) > 0: Thus the price is below marginal
cost for n large.
31Proof of proposition 8
As shown in the preceding proof, the term t￿
n converges to zero at the




n2 converges to 0 at the same rate as 1
n2.
As a result, t
n2(￿ ￿ 1) ￿
’q( 1
n;an)
n2 is positive when n is large.
Proof of proposition 10
Both for the free and the pay media we have:

































































02 ’a ￿ ’aq
￿
< 0
Proof of lemma 11
For a given n, the advertising equilibrium level in the quantity and in the
















32Since v is decreasing with a, we obtain that an < ao(n):
Recall that the level of entry in the quantity model n￿
C(a) is given by
t






The condition de￿ning no(a) is
t






















n;￿)d￿: And thus n￿
C(a) > no(a).
Proof of proposition 12
Consider ￿rst the benchmark case vq(:) ￿ 0 : the equilibrium and socially








k and no =
q
t
4k) and the equilibrium level and the socially optimal level of advertising
are independent of n : a￿
C = a￿
B = a￿(0) < ao.
Assume vqa ￿ 0 and ’qa ￿ 0. We use lemma 11 together with lemma 2
to obtain the result. The sign of
dn￿
C






negative, smaller than @an
@n < 0. This implies that for n ￿ n￿
C; n￿
C(an) ￿ n:
Then ao(n) > an implies that if n ￿ n￿
C; then n > n￿
C(an) > n￿
C(ao(n)) >
no(ao(n)): Thus we must have no < n￿
C and as a consequence ao = ao(no) >
ano > a￿
C. Moreover since @an
@n < 0 and n￿
C < n￿
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